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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PLEADING
DAMAGES IN NORTH CAROLINA
HENRY BRADis, JR.* AND JAMES R. TROTTERt
KINDs op DAMAGES-COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIvE, ACTUAL
AND NomINAL, GENERAL AND SPECIAL
For purposes of classification, damages may be either compensatory
or punitive, to distinguish between those with which the law attempts
to make the injured plaintiff whole and those with which it punishes
wrongdoing.' Compensatory damages are awarded in an effort to place
the injured person as nearly as possible in the same condition in which
he would have been had the injury not occurred.2 The right to recover
them is property which vests in the person wronged immediately upon
the commission of the wrong.3
Punitive or exemplary damages are not property and are not awarded
to plaintiff as a matter of right.4 Some aggravating circumstance, such
as fraud,5 oppression, malice, wilfulness, wantonness, or reckless dis-
regard of plaintiff's rights, must accompany defendant's wrong to per-
mit their award ;6 and they are allowed, as a matter of public policy, to
punish the defendant and to deter others from like behavior.7 Earlier
North Carolina cases referred to these damages as vindictive damages or
* Dean of the School of Law of the University of North Carolina.
t Member of the Staff of TEE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
'For a more general discussion of punitive damages see McCormick, Some
Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8 N. C. L. REv. 129 (1929).
'Bowen v. Fidelity Bank, 209 N. C. 140, 183 S. E. 266 (1935).
Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 627, 47 S. E. 811 (1904).
' Ibid.
rIn Swinton v. Savory Realty Co., 236 N. C. 723, 73 S. E. 2d 785 (1952), the
court held that allegation and proof of a cause of action for fraud did not, without
more, permit the jury to award punitive damages. At page 727 it said: "There
was no evidence of insult, indignity, malice, oppression or bad motive other than
the same false representations for which they have received the amount demanded.
Here fraud is not an accompanying element of an independent tort but the par-
ticular tort alleged."
I For illustrative cases, see Ward v. Western Union Tel. Co., 226 N. C. 175,
37 S. E. 2d 123 (1946) (not allowed where interstate message involved) ; Lay v.
Gazette Publishing Co., 209 N. C. 134, 183 S. E. 416 (1935) (not allowed in libel
action where no evidence defendant was malicious, wanton or reckless) ; Bonaparte
v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934) (allowed in action
against undertaker for arbitrarily withholding deceased's body from his widow).
See also Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N. C. 154, 25 S. E. 2d 626 (1943) ("Gross
negligence or malicious wrongdoing") ; Binder v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894 (1942) (several slightly varying statements
as to when allowable).
7Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N. C. 180, 198 S. E. 647 (1938) ; Carmichael
v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 157 N. C. 21, 72 S. E. 619 (1911).
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smart money.8 In cases in which their award is permissible, punitive
damages are within the sole discretion of the jury and the jury is not
compelled to allow them. The judge may set them aside if he feels
that they are out of proportion to "the circumstances of contumely and
indignity" of the act.0 They may not be awarded unless some com-
pensatory damages, actual or nominal, are awarded. 10 Further, when
an award of compensatory damages is set aside, any award of punitive
damages which accompanied it must likewise be set aside.1
Ordinarily, the assessment of punitive damages is confined to actions
proceeding upon a tort theory, and it has been held that such damages
are not allowed in contract actions with the sole exception of the action
for breach of promise to marry.12
Corporations as well as other principals may be held liable for such
damages for the acts of their agents.' 3 However, no punitive damages
may be awarded against an insane defendant.14
Prayers for punitive damages must be supported by allegations show-
ing the aggravating circumstances which justify the award. The malice
required is actual malice, rather than that implied by law from the in-
tentional doing of that which is inherently dangerous.15 It is proper
in seeking such damages to prove the financial condition of the de-
fendant,'6 but not of the plaintiff.'T  In view of this, the court will not
reverse a judge who refuses to strike allegations describing defendant's
financial condition or reputed wealth ;18 though there is a strong argu-
ment that such allegations constitute a pleading of evidence.
Nominal damages are those recoverable where some legal right has
been invaded but no actual loss or injury has bene demonstrated.' 0 The
award is some trifling sum and is given in recognition of the technical
injury. All that plaintiff need allege and prove is the violation of the
8 Smithwick v. Ward, 52 N. C. 64 (1859) (defendant was allowed to prove his
criminal conviction and punishment by the state to mitigate punitive damages).9 Worthy v. Knight, 210 N. C. 498, 187 S. E. 771 (1936) ; Tripp v. American
Co., 193 N. C. 614, 137 S. E. 871 (1927).
"0 See cases cited, infra note 21. See also, however, Walker v. L. B. Price
Mercantile Co., 203 N. C. 511, 166 S. E. 391 (1932) (in assault case, jury apparent-
ly labeled all damages punitive, but, under the circumstances, judgment on verdict
affirmed), and Ferrell v. Siegle, 195 N. C. 102, 141 S. E. 474 (1927).
" Gaskins v. Cidbury, 227 N. C. 468, 4Z S. E. 2d 513 (1947).
"
2Richardson v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S. E. 235(1900) ; Note, 11 N. C. L. REv. 160 (1933).13Hairston v. Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 642, 18 S. E. 2d 166 (1941).
' Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N. C. 191, 198 S. E. 619 (1938).
" Baker v. Winslow, 184 N. C. 1, 113 S. E. 570 (1922).
v. Jones Brothers Bakery, Inc., 234 N. C. 660, 68 S. E. 2d 313 (1951)
Reeves v. Winn, 97 N. C. 246, 1 S. E. 448 (1887); Adcock v. Marsh, 30 N. C.
360 1848).
Reeves v. Winn, 97 N. C. 246, 1 S. E. 448 (1887).Taylor v. Jones Brothers Bakery, Inc., 234 N. C. 660, 68 S. E. 2d 213 (1951).9
-airston v. Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 642, 18 S. E. 2d 166 (1941).
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right, and the damages follow as a matter of course.2 0  The importance
of nominal damages may go beyond the mere vindication of the right,
for without them there may be no punitive damages 21 and there is no
"peg on which to hang the costs." 22
Nominal damages are distinguished from actual damages-the latter
being awarded in situations in which substantial physical, mental or
pecuniary injury to the plaintiff is demonstrated. Often "compensa-
tory" and "actual" are used interchangeably, with the inference that
"nominal" damages are neither; but, logically, "actual" and "nominal"
are both "compensatory."
Actual damages are subdivided into general and special damages and,
for pleading purposes, these labels distinguish between those that may
be proved under general allegations indicating substantial damage and
those that require particular pleading as a basis for proof.2 3  General
damages have been characterized variously as those which "naturally,"
"necessarily," "ordinarily," "logically," or "proximately" arise from
the facts established; or as the damages that would accrue to any per-
son suffering a similar injury without reference to some special char-
acter, condition, or circumstance of the plaintiff.2 4 To lay the basis for
proof of general damages, all that is supposedly required of the pleader
is the allegation of facts giving rise to the damages and a simple state-
ment such as "plaintiff has suffered damage to the amount of $1,000.-
00."25
Special damages are those which, though actually resulting from
the wrongful act, are not considered as a common consequence, nor-
mally resulting from such an act. They are extraordinary and unusual,
or peculiar to the particular plaintiff or case. Departure from the
norm is logically the important clue for distinguishing special from
general damage. The reason for requiring that special damages be
pleaded with particularity in order to lay the basis for proof is, of
course, to prevent surprise.26
Our court has been, on the whole, rather liberal in permitting proof
" Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N. C. 740, 12 S. E. 2d 671 (1940).
" Worthy v. Knight, 210 N. C. 498, 187 S. E. 771 (1936) ; Saunders v. Gilbert,
156 N. C. 463, 72 S. E. 610 (1911).
" Hairston v. Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 642, 18 S. E. 2d 166 (1941).
2" There are at least two classes of cases in which "special damages" is a par-
ticularized phrase of art. These are public nuisance and defamation cases. Both
are subsequently discussed.
-"Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894(1942); Ringgold v. Land, 212 N. C. 369, 193 S. E. 267 (1937); Conrad v.Shuford, 174 N. C. 719, 94 S. E. 424 (1917); McINTosn, NORTH CAROLINA
PRAcrICE AND PaOCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 409 (1929) ; BLAcies LAW DiCrONARY
468 (4th ed. 1951).
_McINTo SH, op. d. supra note 24. at 409.
26 Oberholtzer v. Huffman, 234 N. C. 399, 67 S. E. 2d 263 (1951) ; Binder v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894 (1942) ; Conrad
v. Shuford, 174 N. C. 719, 94 S. E. 424 (1917).
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under fairly general allegations.2 7  But the distinction between general
and special damages is vague, at best, and is not always interpreted in
a strictly logical manner.2 8 Therefore, in case of doubt, the wise pleader
will allege items of injury with some particularity. However, he will
also include a general allegation of such character as to indicate that he
does not intend to be limited by those particulars alleged. He can hope,
at least, that this will induce the court not to invoke the rule that, if
particulars alleged are "comprehensive and inclusive," they will confine
the proof, excluding even evidence of other items normally classifiable
as general damages.2 9
ALLEGATION OF DAMAGES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Factual allegations which clearly show that the plaintiff has suffered
substantial damage should permit proof and recovery of general dam-
ages, even though no specific sum be named in the body of the com-
plaint. However, it is both customary and proper to include a factual
allegation (as distingiushed from the prayer for relief) stating the
amount of damages the plaintiff claims to have suffered. Particularly
because of the North Carolina practice of reading pleadings to the jury,
the plaintiff's attorney is likely to fix this amount at a figure adequately
reflecting the inclinations of even the most liberal juryman. Indeed, he
is virtually compelled to take into consideration the psychological effect
on the jury.3 0 As already indicated, if there are abnormal factors in
the particular case which tend to justify recovery of an unusual amount,
they should be specially alleged as they are probably classifiable as
special damages and the allegation is a necessary basis for proof. Even
if aggravating factors are classifiable as general damages, it is perfectly
proper to allege them and, again, the plaintiff's attorney is likely to con-
sider the effect upon the jury.31
It is provided by statute that the complaint should contain a demand
for the relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled, and that,
" In Conrad v. Shuford, 174 N. C. 719, 94 S. E. 424 (1917), plaintiff alleged
injury to his back, head, nose and ribs as the result of defendant's negligence. He
was allowed to show that he had a ven on his back which had become bruised
and inflamed. In Davis v. Wall, 142 N. C. 450, 55 S. E. 350 (1906), an allegation
that defendant trespassed on plaintiff's land and removed timber trees "to his great
damage" was sufficient to permit plaintiff to prove and recover the value of the
timber removed, plus "any damage done to the land in removing it therefrom."
"' See text infra at notes 51 and 52.
29 See Price v. Goodman, 226 N. C. 223, 37 S. E. 2d 592 (1946) ; cf. Conrad v.
Shuford, 174 N. C. 719, 94 S. E. 424 (1917).
0 The authors of this article seriously question the desirability of reading
pleadings to the jury. However, so long as the practice continues, a lawyer
necessarily considers its effect upon his pleadings.
"See Barron v. Cain, 216 N. C. 282, 4 S. E. 2d 618 (1939). When plaintiff
was seeking recovery on quantum meruit for personal services, it was proper to
allege that by reason of defendant's attitude and temperament her services were
worth more than they would otherwise have been.
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if recovery of money is sought, the amount should be stated.3 2 This is
a clear direction to the careful pleader, but, at least in cases in which an
answer is filed, it is not an absolute necessity. Except where there is
no answer, the court may grant any relief consisent with the case made
by the complaint and embraced within the issue.8 3 The court will grant
relief, either legal or equitable, according to the facts alleged and proved,
even though there is no formal prayer for relief or the prayer asks
for relief different from that actually granted.34 "In numerous and
repeated decisions of this Court we have held that neither a particular
form of statement nor a special prayer for relief should be allowed
as determinative or controlling, but rights are declared and justice ad-
ministered on the facts which are alleged and properly established."3 5
The prayer for relief becomes of greater significance when there is
no answer, because in that situation, by statute, the relief granted cannot
exceed that demanded in the complaint. 36  This limiting statute does
not expressly mention relief different in kind from that demanded in
the complaint; but if, for instance, a prayer for relief demanded only
damages, it would seem clearly irregular for a default judgment to grant
specific performance, even though the factual allegations in the complaint
might justify the latter relief.3 7 Literally interpreted, the statute means
that if there is no prayer for relief there can be no recovery in default
situations. Perhaps it will not always be so literally interpreted where
the factual allegations of the complaint clearly show the kind and
quantity of relief to which plaintiff is entitled ;88 but the cautious pleader
will certainly not omit his prayer.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-122 (3) (1943).
"N. C. Gail. STAT. § 1-226 (1943).
"Lamb v. Staples, 234 N. C. 166, 66 S. E. 2d 660 (1951); Griggs v. York-
Shipley, Inc., 229 N. C. 572, 50 S. E. 2d 914 (1948) ; Jones v. Atlantic & W. R.
Co., 193 N. C. 590, 137 S. E. 706 (1927) ; Bryant v. Canady, 169 N. C. 579, 86
S. E. 584 (1915) ; Bradburn v. Roberts, 148 N. C. 214, 61 S. E. 617 (1908) (rule
applied to relief to which defendant entitled); Knight v. Houghtalling, 85 N. C.
17 (1881). If necessary, the complaint may be amended, before or after judgment,
to conform to the facts found. Warrington v. Hardison, 185 N. C. 76, 116 S. E.
166 (1923).
"Stacey Cheese Co. v. Pipkin, 155 N. C. 394, 400, 71 S. E. 442, 444 (1911).
See also Carolina Mortgage Co. v. Long, 205 N. C. 533, 172 S. E. 209 (1933)(foreclosure may be decreed, though prayer asks only for money judgment and
general relief) ; Councill v. Bailey, 154 N. C. 54, 69 S. E. 760 (1910) (order for
specific performance included provisions not specifically requested in the prayer) ;
Wright v. Teutonia Insurance Co., 138 N. C. 488, 51 S. E. 55 (1905) (under
peculiar circumstances, in suit on fire insurance policy, plaintiff recovered for loss
of tobacco though he had demanded recovery for loss of machinery) ; Oates,
Williams & Co. v. Kendall, 67 N. C. 241 (1872) (trover versus money had and
received).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-226 (1943).
17 See Burrowes v. Burrowes, 210 N. C. 788, 188 S. E. 648 (1936). In a di-
vorce case, in which the existence of a minor son of the marriage was alleged, the
prayer for relief sought only divorce. It was held improper for the court, on
default judgment, to grant plaintiff custody of the son.
"See Dunn v. Barnes, 73 N. C. 273 (1875). Complaint on a note clearly
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On the other hand, the pleader cannot lay the basis for an inflated
default judgment merely by including an exaggerated prayer for relief.
Where the factual allegations show clearly that plaintiff is not entitled
to the kind or quantity of relief demanded, they are controlling.80
Should a verdict be returned by the jury which the court does not
feel conforms to the facts of the case, the judge has two courses of
action. First, if he believes the verdict to be excessive, he may, with
the consent of the party receiving the award, reduce it to a sum in keep-
ing with the facts shown. 40  (He could also probably raise the amount
of an inadequate verdict with the permission of the party assessed, but
in the nature of things such permission will seldom be forthcoming.)
Secondly, the judge may set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on
the issue of damages alone.41  Such action is within his sole discretion
and is not subject to review except for abuse of that discretion.42
Under a statute which seems to have been little used, a defendant in
a contract action may serve with his answer a written offer that, if he
fails in his defense, the damages be assessed at a specified sum. If the
plaintiff consents and wins a verdict the damages must be assessed ac-
cordingly. If the plaintiff refuses the offer and fails to win a verdict
exceeding its amount, the defendant is entitled to recover his expenses
incurred in preparing for the issue of damages.43
PERSONAL'INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
The basic rule in personal injury actions is that the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover all damages, past, present and prospective, which are
the natural and probable consequences of defendant's wrongdoing. 44 In
the case of "pure torts," such as assault, the law infers that some dam-
ages will naturally arise from the commission of the tort and no dam-
age allegation is necessary in order to state a cause of action. Nominal
alleged the amount due, but prayer left the amount blank. Defendant's demurrer
was held frivolous, his request for leave to answer, was denied, and judgment was
entered for the amount of the note and interest. This differs from the ordinary
default situation in that defendant had appeared and demurred. While G. S. 1-226
literally applies wherever there is no answer, it is doubtful if it is intended to cover
a case in which, after demurring unsuccessfully, defendant attempts to limit
plaintiff's recovery by failure to file answer.
" Federal Land Bank v. Davis, 215 N. C. 100, 1 S. E. 2d 350 (1939) ; Currie
v. Golconda Mining and Milling Co., 157 N. C. 209, 72 S. E. 980 (1911); Junge
v. MacKnight, 137 N. C. 285, 49 S. E. 474 (1904). See also Simms v. Sampson,
221 N. C. 379, 20 S. E. 2d 554 (1942).
"' Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N. C. 760, 140 S. E. 807 (1927).
"'Rushing v. Seaboard Airline R. R., 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908).
The judge may also grant a complete new trial.
"2 Harvey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 153 N. C. 567, 69 S. E. 627 (1910).
An earlier case, Benton v. Collins, 125 N. C. 83, 34 S. E. 242 (1899), held that
there could be no review, but the rule was soon modified to conform to the present
view.
Vw N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-542 (1943).
" Lane v. Southern Railway Co., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 885 (1926) ; Ledford
v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922).
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damages may be recovered, though there is no allegation or proof of
actual damage. 45 There are some torts, such as negligence and fraud,
which are not "pure torts," and in these situations injury or damage is
a necessary element of the cause of action.46 In such cases, a complaint
which fails to allege facts demonstrating injury or damage will be sub-
ject to demurrer.
In all personal injury cases, whether the tort be "pure or not, it seems
probable that all normal physical consequences may be proved under a
simple allegation that plaintiff suffered "serious bodily injury."' 7  In
practice North Carolina pleaders seem to have included considerably
more detail; but too much detail may raise questions as to whether
the allegations confine the proof-as where, for example, some further
consequence of the injury develops between the time the pleading is
drawn and the time the trial is reached.
In one case, our court permitted proof that the plaintiff's injuries
were aggravated because of a pre-existing wen on his back, though it
had not been specifically pleaded.4 8  However, faced with a situation in
which plaintiff's injuries have been seriously aggravated by a pre-existing
disease, the wise plaintiff's attorney will probably wish to plead it
specifically on the theory that it may well be held to be special damages.
If it is contended that the injury has deprived the plaintiff of normal
mental capacity, that should almost certainly be specially alleged.49 In
cises in which the defendant is liable for aggravation of the plaintiff's
injuries caused by the act of a third party, it is probably better to allege
the facts specifically, though whether our court regards this as general
or special damage is none too clear.50
Medical and hospital expenses, loss of time from work, loss of
earning capacity and loss of profits are all traditionally considered
"Wolfe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 211 N. C. 295, 189 S. E. 772 (1937)(slander per se) ; Lowry v. Barker, 211 N. C. 613, 190 S. E. 341 (1937) (false
imprisonment); Walker v. L. B. Price Mercantile Co., 203 N. C. 511, 166 S. E.
391 (1932) (assault); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811 (1904)
(libel). See, however, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 6-18(4) (1943): "In an action for
assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, criminal
conversation, or seduction, if the plaintiff recovers less than $50 damages, he shall
recover no more costs than damages.!
"' Hill v. Snider, 217 N. C. 437, 8 S. E. 2d 202 (1940).
"7 "The pleader is not required by the rule to go into an account of minute
details and to specify every muscle that ached and every nerve that throbbed, every
contusion or fracture, and every racking pain." Conrad v. Shuford, 174 N. C.
719, 721, 94 S. E. 424, 425 (1917). See also Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131
N. C. 536, 46 S. E. 983 (1902) (allegation that plaintiff "became nervous and
frightened ... and was greatly disturbed in body and mind," at least in absence of
showing of surprise, supported proof that plaintiff was rendered almost helpless,
could not attend to daily duties, and had female trouble out of its regular course).
"Conrad v. Shuford, 174 N. C. 719, 94 S. E. 424 (1917).
"McCR Icic, DAMAGES § 8 (1935).
"See Bost v. Metcalf, 219 N. C. 607, 14 S. E. 2d 648 (1941) (involving liability
of original tort-feasor for negligent treatment of injured person by a physician);
Lane v. Southern Railway Co., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 855 (1926).
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special damages which should be alleged."'. However, with the possible
exception of loss of profits, all of these seem to be perfectly normal
consequences of physical injury. In one case our court has intimated
that all of them, except loss of profits, may be proved under a general
allegation of bodily injury, with the defendant being left to protect
himself against surprise by a motion to make more definite and certain.52
Unfortunately, the only point actually before the court was whether it
was permissible for the plaintiff to prove a ten or fifteen dollar hos-
pital bill without having alleged hospital expense. The court held that
it was permissible, but since the verdict was for $1,500.00 and the hos-
pital bill was comparatively inconsequential, there may be some question
as to the extent to which the case will be followed when more sub-
stantial sums are involved. On principle, the case announces an enlight-
ened rule which should receive general application.
Where accompanied by physical injury (even if the physical injury
be itself a product of fright), mental anguish may be a proper element
of recovery.53 Where there is adequate basis for claiming it, the plain-
tiff's attorney will ordinarily wish to prove it because it may increase
the size of the verdict and render it less likely that the verdict will be
set aside as excessive.54 Though the matter is not free from doubt, it is
possible that in North Carolina evidence of mental anguish may be
introduced despite the fact that it is not specifically alleged in the com-
plaint.55
If the plaintiff was operating a business from which he derived earn-
ings or profits, loss of such earnings or profits is an appropriate element
of damages to be considered by the jury in a personal injury case,50 at
15 McCoRmxcic, DAMAGES § 8 (1935). Compare Federal Forms 9, 10, 14 and15.
52 Sparks v. Holland, 209 N. C. 705, 184 S. E. 552 (1936).
" Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E. 625 (1936).
For a discussion of mental anguish in North Carolina see Notes, 28 N. C. L. REv.
318 (1950), 18 N. C. L. REv. 71 (1939).
" Though the monetary equivalent of such intangibles as pain, suffering, and
humiliation is concededly not subject to any precise measurement, it is improper
to instruct that such damages are discretionary with the jury. Only punitive
damages are discretionary. Mooney v. Mull, 216 N. C. 410, 5 S. E. 2d 122 (1939).
However, compare the charge disapproved in this case with the one approved in
Lowry v. Barker, 211 N. C. 613, 190 S. E. 341 (1937).
"Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N. C. 31, 94 S. E. 702 (1918). There
was no express allegation of mental anguish, though there was an allegation that
plaintiff suffered great bodily injury "from which injuries he continues to be
sick, sore, maimed, and disordered, and still suffers great pain and distress."
The court said: "As all pain is mental and centers in the brain, it follows that as
an element of damage for personal injury the injured party is allowed to recover
for actual suffering of mind and body when they are the immediate and necessary
consequences of the negligent injury." The doubt as to the meaning of the case
arises because of uncertainty as to whether the court intended its opinion to
apply to mental anguish in its ordinary meaning.al Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N. C. 435, 50 S. E. 2d 534 (1948) ; Ledford
v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922).
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least to the extent that they were predicated upon his personal services
as distinguished from investment of capital. Whether such loss is classi-
fiable as special damage presents much the same problem as loss of time
from work on a salary or wages; though, since loss of profits from a
business may be more uncertain or more unusual, perhaps the case for
requiring special pleading is stronger. Certainly any claim for loss of
profits based on plaintiff's inability to carry out some particular con-
tract should be regarded as special damage and expressly pleaded.
Whether such profits may be recovered at all depends upon whether,
under all the circumstances, the court regards them as too remote and
speculative. 57  However, in general, in tort actions, recovery of special
damages is not limited by any requirement that the circumstances giving
rise to such damages be known to the defendant at the time of the com-
mission of the tort.5
8
A plaintiff suffering personal injuries has but a single cause of action
and he may not bring successive actions if he fails to recover all of his
damages on the first try. Indeed, if in the same occurrence he suffers
property damage as well as personal injury, he still has but a single
cause of action and can litigate but once.59 In a personal injury action
there is a lump sum recovery of all damages, past, present and pro-
spective, and these must be reduced to their present worth. 0 The jury
is not bound by any rule of thumb, save the present worth rule, in de-
termining the monetary value of plaintiff's damages. Subject to the
discretionary power of the court to set aside the verdict, the sum to be
awarded is left to the jury's sound judgment.6 1
Recovery by one spouse for injury to the other has undergone con-
siderable change since the passage of the Married Woman's Act in
" See Kitchen Lumber Co. v. Tallassee Power Co., 206 N. C. 515, 174 S. E.
427 (1934) (whether lost profits in hauling lumber recoverable in action for
negligent destruction of bridge) ; Bullard v. Ross, 205 N. C. 495, 171 S. E. 789
(1933) (where defendant negligently drove truck into plaintiff's mules, killing
one and injuring other, damage to plaintiff's crops too remote and speculative).
These are not personal injury cases, but they seem applicable to tort situations
in general.
" Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N. C. 154, 25 S. E. 2d 626 (1943). However, when
the action, though brought on a tort theory, is in reality grounded on a contract
relationship, it must appear that the special circumstances were known or should
have been known to the defendant when the tort was committed, if not when the
contract was made. Causey v. Davis, 185 N. C. 155, 116 S. E. 401 (1923);
Virginia-Carolina Peanut Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 155 N. C. 148, 71
S. E. 71 (1911).
"Eller v. Railroad, 140 N. C. 140, 52 S. E. 305 (1905). For an exception
to this rule see Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686 (1929).
" Mintz v; Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 233 N. C. 607, 65 S. E. 2d 120 (1951);
Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922). The
mortuary tables, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (1943), may be used in determining
plaintiff's life expectancy, as may his health, constitution and habits. Starnes v.
Tyson, 226 N. C. 395, 38 S. E. 2d 211 (1946).
. See Gasque v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 821, 178 S. E. 848 (1935). But see also
note 22 supra.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
1913. 62 At common law when the wife was injured she could sue in
her husband's name for personal injuries and losses, and the husband
could sue for loss of consortium or damage to his marital interest and
for expenses incurred as the result of his wife's injuries. Now our
court holds that either of the spouses may recover for his or her own
injuries but neither may recover for the injuries of the other.0 3 Fur-
ther, there may be no recovery for loss of consortium, with attendant
mental anguish, for injuries negligently inflicted, though there may be
such recovery when the wrong is willful or malicious.0 4  Either spouse
may recover money expended because of the injuries to the other, but
in order to do so the expenditure should be specially pleaded and
proved.65
As a general rule an unemancipated minor cannot, in a personal in-
jury action, recover loss of time or diminished earning capacity for the
period of his minority. 68 In the absence of emancipation, the father
alone has the right to the child's earnings and he alone may recover for
their loss. 67 However, the father may waive his right to such recovery,
and he is deemed to have done so when he sues as the minor's next
friend and recovers such elements of damage on behalf of the child. 8
Recovery in an action for wrongful death exists solely by statute0
and strict compliance with the conditions of the statute is required.70
The right of action rests in the executor, administrator or collector of
decedent, and he alone, and in his representative capacity alone, may
bring the suit.71 By the terms of the statute, the recovery is not an asset
of the estate, except to the extent of being liable for burial expenses, but
goes to the next of kin. The estate representative may also bring an
action for damages, growing out of the same occurrence, sustained by
the injured person during his lifetime; and any recovery in the action
becomes an asset of the estate.72  There should be no overlap between
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §52-10 (1943, recompiled 1950).
"' Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1944).
Helrnstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1944);
Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307 (1924). For a
discussion of consortium and related problems see Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 178
(1950).
" Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1944);
McDaniel v. Trent Mills, 197 N. C. 342, 148 S. E. 440 (1929).
"' Shipp v. United Stage Lines, 192 N. C. 475, 135 S. E. 339 (1926) ; Hayes
v. Southern Railway, 141 N. C. 195, 53 S. E. 847 (1906).
"'Hayes v. Southern Railway, 141 N. C. 195, 53 S. E. 847 (1906).
s Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N. C. 435 50 S. E. 2d 534 (1948).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-173, 28-174 (1943, recompiled 1950).
Monfils v. Hazelwood, 218 N. C. 215, 10 S. E. 2d 673 (1940).
tMcCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 229 N. C. 57 47 S E 2d 532 (1948);
Harrison v. Carter, 226 N. C. 36, 36 S. E. 2d 700 (1949).
"'Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. 2d 105 (1946). This
recovery may include pain and suffering, mental anguish, hospital and medical
exopenses, loss of time, etc., from the time of injury to the time of death. In the
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the two recoveries."
In North Carolina the court has repeatedly held that the measure of
recovery in a wrongful death action is the present value of the net worth
of that part of decedent's life which is cut off by the defendant's
wrong.7 4 Simply stated, the figure is arrived at by deducting decedent's
probable living expenses from his probable earnings and reducing the
remainder to its present worth. Despite the fact that the next of kin
are the recipients of the award, it has been considered error to permit
the jury to compute the award on the basis of the value of decedent's
life to them. In Hanks v. Norfolk & Western R. R.,75 the court
sanctioned the introduction of evidence which certainly had some tend-
ency to prove that the next of kin had not suffered any loss because of
decedent's death.71 The court itself seemed to be thinking in terms of
that tendency when it referred to providing help to the jury in arriving
at "pecuniary worth to the recipients or disposees of the recovery."
Nevertheless, the court did not purport to abandon the previously an-
nounced North Carolina rule, and subsequent cases have reiterated that
rule.77
Because pecuniary loss to the next of kin furnishes a rational and
perhaps less nebulous measure of recovery than the net worth of de-
cedent's lost life, it is possible that future decisions, building upon the
Hanks case, may yet modify the net worth rule.78
Regardless of the manner in which compensatory damages are com-
puted, it seems clear that punitive damages are not recoverable in an
action for wrongful death.70 The purpose of the statute is to compensate
for loss and not to punish the defendant.
Hoke case, without objection and therefore without decision as to the propriety ofjoinder, the two causes of action were joined in the same suit.
7' For further discussion of this see Note, 25 N. C. L. REv. 84 (1946).
SRea v. Simonwitz, 226 N. C. 379, 38 S. E. 2d 194 (1946); Carpenter v. Ashe-
ville Power and Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400 (1925).
"230 N. C. 179, 52 S. E. 2d 717 (1949), commented on in Note, 28 N. C. L.REv. 106 (1949).
"' The evidence admitted showed that decedent had been convicted for non-
support of his family; that the day before his death he had filed a divorce action,
alleging an agreement regarding custody and support of his children, and that
the inventory of his estate showed no assets other than the wrongful death action
and $110 in wages due.
" Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N. C. 728, 71 S. E. 2d 49 (1952); Journigan v.
Little River Ice Co., 233 N. C. 180, 63 S. E. 2d 183 (1950).
" Critics of the present North Carolina rule assert: (1) The real reason for
the award is to compensate decedent's family and this can more nearly be done
by using loss suffered by the family as a measure of damages, rather than a hypo-
thetical pecuniary worth. (2) The factors entering into determination of a man's
future "net worth" are so variable and multitudinous that it is virtually impossible
for a jury to arrive at a sum which may be said to be accurate. (3) If decedent
has no next of kin. the award escheats to the University of North Carolina; and
the critics have difficulty perceiving that the University has suffered a loss. The
authors of this article do not undertake to evaluate these criticisms.
" Martin v. Currie, 230 N. C. 511, 53 S. E. 2d 447 (1949).
NORTH CAROLINA ,LAW REVIEW
INJURY TO INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
When the complaint alleges facts showing that the defendant has
wrongfully converted, detained, damaged or destroyed specified personal
property of the plaintiff, this is sufficient to establish plaintiff's right to
recover damages and to permit proof of substantial pecuniary loss.
Even in negligence cases, in which damage is a necessary element of the
cause of action, a general allegation of damage to or destruction of
specific property, without details and without specific allegation of the
dollar amount of the loss, would seem sufficient for both purposes.
However, in all cases, it is better pleading to include at least a general
allegation of damage and a statement of the amount claimed.
When plaintiff seeks to recover possession of specific property, the
ancillary remedy of claim and delivery" ° is available. Claim and de-
livery is not itself an action, but is merely a writ or order issued in a
pending action to enable a plaintiff to get possession of the property and
hold it until the final judgment determines who is to have it by right.81
Where a defendant has converted the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff
has the unquestionable right to determine whether to demand the prop-
erty or damages. If he chooses to seek damages alone, the defendant
may not force him to take back the converted property, even though it
is tendered with its value undiminished.8 2 If the principal relief sought
is possession, the plaintiff is additionally entitled to damages resulting
from deterioration and detention. 83 Factual allegations showing de-
tention would ordinarily seem sufficient to support proof of damages
flowing from such detention, but clarity is promoted if some allegation
of damage and a prayer seeking damages are included. And, if un-
usual damage is claimed, such as loss of use of the property in the plain-
tiff's business, 84 or loss of profits from a contract,8 5 it may well be
classified as special damage which must be expressly alleged.
When return of the property is not possible or is not sought, the
minimum amount recoverable is the value of the property at the time
of the conversion.86  If any additional sum is sought, it is the policy
oN. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-472 through 1-484 (1943).
"McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 829, p. 958 (1929).
"
2 Waller v. Bowling, 108 N. C. 290, 12 S. E. 990 (1891) ; Stephens v. Koonce,
103 N. C. 266, 9 S. E. 315 (1889).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-230 (1943); Waller v. Bowling, 108 N. C. 290. 12
S. E. 990 (1891). For defendant's rights when plaintiff, after having employed
claim and delivery, fails to prove the right to possession, see Boylston Insurance
Co. v. Davis, 70 N. C. 485 (1874); Holmes v. Godwin, 69 N. C. 467 (1873).
" Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894
(1942). The court found it unnecessary to decide whether loss of use was general
or special damage, since in fact it was expressly pleaded; but there is some in-
dication that it could be regarded as general damage.
"5 See cases cited infra notes 95 and 96. Those cases are not grounded on
conversion, but it is believed that they would apply in conversion situations.
" Cases cited supra note 82.
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of wisdom to include factual allegations supporting such a demand. If
the issue is properly framed, the jury may, in its discretion, allow
interest from the date of conversion.sT No factual allegation of loss of
such interest would seem to be necessary or even appropriate. However,'
it would be wise, though probably not necessary, to request the interest
in the prayer for relief.
In other cases involving damage to or destruction of personal prop-
erty by the negligence or intentional conduct of the defendant, a single
notion as to the measure of minimum general damages has been ad-
hered to by our court. The plaintiff may recover the difference between
the market value of the property immediately before the injury and the
market value immediately after the injury.88 It makes no difference
whether the property involved is a cow 8 9 or an automobile90 or some-
thing else. The valuation should be made as of the time and place of
the injury, though evidence of the value may be as of a reasonable time
before or after the injury.0 1
Damages, other than the diminished value of the property, which are
in fact proximately caused by the defendant's wrongful act may also be
recovered. These include loss of use and loss of profits. Dependent
upon the type of property involved, either may be regarded as a normal
consequence of damage or destruction; but if either is at all unusual
under the particular circumstances it may rationally be classified as
special damage, and loss of profits is generally so classified. 92 Our
court has referred to both loss of use and loss of profits as "special
damages."0 3 It follows that, as a precaution, they should be expressly
alleged.
Earlier North Carolina cases tended to deny recovery for loss of
profits in tort cases as too remote, uncertain and speculative.94 Since
" White v. Riddle, 198 N. C. 511, 152 S. E. 501 (1930); Lance v. Butler,
135 N. C. 419, 47 S. E. 488 (1904)'; Stephens v. Koonce, 103 N. C. 266, 9 S. E. 315(1889). A judge may not add the interest where the jury has not done so.
Patapsco Guano Co. v. Magee, 86 N. C. 350 (1882).
"United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. P. & F. Motor Express, 220
N. C. 721, 18 S. E. 2d 116 (1941). Occasionally there is a reference to "the
reasonable worth" of the property, but it is not believed that this is intended to
indicate any departure from the market value rule. See Hart v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R., 144 N. C. 91, 56 S. E. 559 (1907).
" Godwin v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R., 104 N. C. 146, 10 S. E. 136 (1889);
Boing v. Raleigh & Gaston R. R., 91 N. C. 199 (1884) ; Roberts v. Richmond &
Danville R. R., 88 N. C. 560 (1883).
" United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. P. & F. Motor Express, 220
N. C. 721. 18 S. E. 2d 116 (1941) ; DeLaney v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C.
647, 135 S. E. 791 (1926) ; West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
185 N. C. 43, 116 S. E. 3 (1923).
"' Newsom v. Cothrane, 185 N. C. 161, 116 S. E. 415 (1923). Cf. Boylston
Insurance Co. v. Davis, 70 N. C. 485 (1874).92McConricK, DAMAGES § 8 (1935).
Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N. C. 637, 65 S. E. 2d 132 (1951).
,Sledge v. Reid, 73 N. C. 440 (1875).
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that time the rule has become more liberal, first allowing recovery for
loss of profits from contracts which the plaintiff had at the time of the
injury,95 and now permitting recovery where the profits are "capable
of being shown with a reasonable degree of certainty." 0  Further,
allegations of loss of use and profits should survive a motion to strike
if evidence of such loss can be considered by the jury in assessing
damages, even though they do not in themselves furnish a proper
measure of damages.97
INJURIES TO INTERESTS OF LANDOWNERS
Any allegations which show a trespass to land state a cause of
action, but to justify recovery of more than nominal damages the facts
alleged should show actual damage. 8 Where the allegations show a
trespass which normally results in substantial damages, probably noth-
ing further is necessary to permit proof of general damages; but here,
as always, it is better to include at least a general allegation that dam-
age was suffered and a statement of the amount. 9
Loss of profits' 00 and mental anguish' 01 may be proper elements of
recovery, but they probably should be specially alleged on the assumption
that they may be classified as special damages. 10 2
Punitive damages may be recovered in trespass cases, provided there
are allegations showing the circumstances of aggravation.103
" Wilson v. Horton Motor Lines, 207 N. C. 263, 176 S. E. 750 (1934) ; Jones
v. Call, 96 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647 (1887).6Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N. C. 637, 65 S. E. 2d 132 (1951);
Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N. C. 154, 25 S. E. 2d 626 (1943).
" Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N. C 637, 65 S E. 2d 132 (1951). See
also Pemberton v. Greensboro, 205 N. C. 599, 172 S. E. 196 (1933), s.ame casc,
208 N. C. 466, 181 S. E. 258 (1935). (Refusal to strike specific damage allega-
tions does not constitute a final decision that evidence to prove them will be
relevant and admissible under the measure of damages applicable to the state
of facts developed by the other evidence.).
"Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N. C. 281, 69 S. E. 2d 553 (1952). Physical
injury to the land is not essential.
" Davis v. Wall, 142 N. C. 450, 55 S. E. 350 (1906). In this case the com-
plaint alleged trespass in cutting and removing timber from plaintiff's land "to
his great damage." Substantial recovery was allowed, and it was not limited
by the other allegations of damages. However, as to the measure of damages
approved in the case, see note 109 infra.
10 Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N. C. 154, 25 S. E. 2d 626 (1943); Johnson
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 140 N. C. 574, 53 S. E. 362 (1906).
101 Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N. C. 281, 69 S. E. 2d 553 (1952). See Note, 31
N. C. L. Riv. 122 (1952).
1. In one case, plaintiff attempted to recover as special damages for the wrong-
ful death of his wife, alleging that defendant's trespass was the immediate cause.
The court remanded the case for repleading, holding the claim improper because
there could be no recovery for the death except in a proper wrongful death action.
Hood v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 162 N. C. 70, 77 S. E. 1096(1913).
1'Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N. C. 281, 69 S. E. 2d 553 (1952) (removing
flowers from grave) ; Brame v. Clark, 148 N. C. 364, 62 S. E. 418 (1908) (tres-
pass with an intent to seduce plaintiff's wife) ; Remington v. Kirby, 120 N. C. 320,
26 S. E. 917 (1897).
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The measure of general damages to real property can vary with the
circumstances, but generally it is held to be the reduction in the market
value of the land as determined before and after the trespass, plus any
further damages incidental to the tort. 04 If a crop is destroyed, the
extent to which the crop has matured at the time of its destruction can
vary the measure of damages. Where the crop was near harvest the
damages were held to be the highest price at which the crop might have
been sold. 0 5 Where the crop was still in the process of cultivation the
measure was the reasonable value of the crop destroyed, 0 6 and where
seed failed to grow the damages were the cost of the seed and sowing,
plus a reasonable rent for the land, less the amount which the plaintiff
could have obtained by renting out the land for some other crop.
0 7
One of the most common actions for trespass in North Carolina is
that based upon wrongful entry plus the cutting and removing of tim-
ber. In such cases the plaintiff may have a choice between a theory of
trespass and a theory of conversion. If the action is brought on the
trespass theory, it is local' 0 8 and the measure of damages is the differ-
ence in the value of the land immediately before and after the tres-
pass.' 09 If conversion of the timber is the theory of the action, it is
transitory and the damages are the value of the trees as timber at the
place of severance where they were converted into personal property."10
While a complaint may withstand demurrer when it is not clear upon
which of these theories the plaintiff intends to proceed, it may be sub-
ject to a motion to make more definite and certain; and where such a
complaint reached the supreme court on a question of venue, the case
was remanded so that the plaintiff could amend or replead."' By
statute, if a defendant knowingly cuts timber on the land of another,
the plaintiff may recover double the value of the timber.
12
10. West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 185 N. C. 43, 116 S. E.
3 (1923); Jeffress v. Norfolk & Southern R. R., 158 N. C. 216, 73 S. E. 1013
(1912).
10 Denby v. Hairston, 8 N. C. 315 (1821).
""
0 Dixon v. District Grand Lodge of Odd Fellows, 174 N. C. 139, 93 S. E.
461 (1917).
107 Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230, 37 S. E. 217 (1900). While this case was
based on contract rather than tort, it is presumed a similar measure of damages
would apply if a crop was ruined by a trespass occurring at the planting stage.
.0. Brady v. Brady, 161 N. C. 325, 77 S. E. 235 (1913).
100 Owens v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 212 N. C. 133, 193 S. E. 2d 219 (1937);
Williams v. Elm City Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 306, 70 S. E. 631 (1911). This latter
case, in effect, overruled Whitfield v. Rowland Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 211, 67
S. E. 512 (1910) and Davis v. Wall, 142 N. C. 450, 55 S. E. 350 (1906), which
held the measure of damages to be the value of the trees on the land after they
had been severed, with incidental damage caused in their removal.
... Brady v. Brady, 161 N. C. 325, 77 S. E. 235 (1913); Wall v. Holloman,
156 N. C. 275, 72 S. E. 369 (1911) ; Bennett v. Thompson, 35 N. C. 146 (1851).
... Richard Cedar Works v. Roper Lumber Co., 161 N. C. 604, 77 S. E. 770
(1913).
"I0N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1 (Cum. Supp. 1951). N. C. GEz. STAT. § 74-32
(1943, recompiled 1950), provides for a similar recovery where there is a willful
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Having some similarity to the action of trespass on land is the
action for nuisance. At present, by statute, there may be a judgment
for damages, for removal of the nuisance, or for both.", If the nui-
sance is public rather than private, there must be an allegation showing
special damages in order to make a good cause of action.'1 4 Here,
however, the term "special damages" has a different meaning than when
used in its ordinary sense, for it implies only that the plaintiff must
allege damages peculiar to him as distinguished from those suffered by
the public at large. Occupants of land who do not have an interest
in the freehold may recover for their own injuries but not for damage
to the freehold." 5 Damages may be recovered for a nuisance even after
it has been abated," 0 provided actual damage has been previously
suffered"1 7 and the action is not barred by the statute of limitations." 8
Where a trespass to land is a continuing trespass the damages
awarded may be either temporary or permanent. If temporary, they
are recoverable up to the time of trial and successive suits may be main-
tained until the trespass ceases." 9 The theory is, apparently, that after
several suits the tort-feasor is likely to remove the source of trouble.
The measure of damages where successive suits are brought may vary
with the use of plaintiff's property. For agricultural land, the measure
is the difference in the productivity of the land before and after the
trespass. 120 In other situations, it may be the diminished rental value,
trespass upon mining property accompanied by a mining or conversion of minerals.
It specifically allows punitive damages in addition to the double recovery. Whether
punitive damages could be awarded under § 1-539.1, quaere.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539 (1943).
""Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N. C. 47, 55 S. E. 2d 923 (1949); Elliott v.
Tallassee Power Co., 190 N. C. 62, 128 S. E. 730 (1925).
' See Arthur v. Henry, 157 N. C. 393, 73 S. E. 206 (1911) and Arthur v.
Henry, 157 N. C. 438, 73 S. E. 211 (1911), where in the first action the owner of
the -property recovered for damages to the freehold plus punitive damages and in
the second his sister, who lived on the property, recovered for damages to her
health caused by the nuisance. Whether the sister could likewise have recovered
punitive damages, quaere. See also Taylor v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 145 N. C.
400, 59 S. E. 129 (1907).
11. Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N. C. 79, 16 S. E. 2d 449 (1941).
litBurris v. Creech, 220 N. C. 302, 17 S. E. 2d 123 (1941). Suit brought
to recover actual and punitive damages for the erection of a "spite fence," and for
abatement. The court held that any loss in value of plaintiff's land would be re-
stored by the abatement, and no other damages was proved. Punitive damages
could not be recovered in the absence of some other damage, despite the aggravated
circumstances.
" N. C. GaN. STAT. §1-52 (1943). Action for continuing trespass must be
brought within three years from the original trespass and not thereafter. Morrow
v. Florence Mills, 181 N. C. 423, 107 S. E. 445 (1921) held that evidence of acts
for which recovery would be barred by the statute of limitations may nevertheless
be admitted on the sole issue of liability.
1 Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N. C. 566, 58 S. E. 2d 343 (1950).
120 Oates v. Algodon Mfg. Co., 217 N. C. 488, 8 S. E. 2d 605 (1940) ; Jones v.
Kramer, 133 N. C. 446, 45 S. E. 827 (1903) ; Spilman v. Roanoke Navigation Co.,
74 N. C. 675 (1876). The important element of damage in these cases is the loss
of crops. Cf. notes 105, 106 and 107 pertaining to the measure of crop damages.
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the reasonable cost of replacement or repair, or the cost of restoring
the property to its original condition, with added damages for other
incidental items of loss.1 21 In any event, the damages are not the same
as in the case of a permanent award. 122  There, under the theory that
defendant is, in effect, purchasing an easement over plaintiff's land on.
which to maintain his trespass, the damages are the diminished pecuniary
value of the land before and after the original offense.
If permanent damages are sought, in every case except where the
defendant is a railroad, they should be alleged and requested. An allega-
tion that plaintiff's land "has been rendered sour and sobbed, and its
fertility destroyed and rendered unfit for agricultural purposes," was
construed as a demand for permanent damages.123  Of course, it is pref-
erable to state the matter clearly and avoid problems of interpretation.
By statute, a suit against a railroad for damages arising from construc-
tion or repair of the road must necessarily seek permanent damages. 1 24
No such statute exists where the suit is (1) between private parties or
(2) between a private party and a public or quasi-public utility, or an
agency having a right of eminent domain or power of condemnation. 2 5
As between private parties, permanent damages may not be recovered
except by consent of both ;126 and if the defendant consents, whether
permanent damages were alleged in the complaint would seem to be of
little consequence. In the other cases mentioned permanent damages
may be assessed upon demand of either party,1 2 7 and the plaintiff seeking
them should make that clear in the complaint. In neither situation may
a counterclaim be pleaded for the condemnation of an easement. Such
relief may be had only through the request for permanent damages or
by a special proceeding.
128
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Upon allegation and proof of breach of a valid contract the plaintiff
is entitled to recover at least nominal damages ;129 and it follows that
... Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N. C. 566, 58 S. E. 2d 343 (1950).1 22 Oates v. Algodon Mfg. Co., 217 N. C. 488, 8 S. E. 2d 605 (1940).
.
2 Parker v. Norfolk & Carolina R. R., 119 N. C. 677, 25 S. E. 722 (1896).
This case arose before passage of N. C. GaN. STAT. § 1-51(2) (1943).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-51(2) (1943), as interpreted by Nichols v. Norfolk
& Carolina R. R., 120 N. C. 495, 26 S. E. 643 (1897).
"2 A fertilizer plant is not of such nature as to fall within this latter group.
Webb v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 662, 87 S. E. 663 (1915).
" Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N. C. 566, 58 S. E. 2d 343 (1950); Adylett v.
Carolina By-Products Co., 215 N. C. 700, 2 S. E. 2d 881 (1939). See also Brown
v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 165 N. C. 421, 81 S. E. 463 (1914) (extent to
which election to try the issue of permanent damage is binding).2
' Phillips v. Chesson, 231 -N. C. 566, 58 S. E. 2d 343 (1950); Clinard v.
Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939); Webb v. Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 662, 87 S. E. 663 (1915) ; Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165
N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914).
"'Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N. C. 167, 43 S. E. 632 (1903).
"'Kirby v. Stokes County Board of Education, 230 N . C. 619, 55 S. E. 2d 322
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such minimal allegations will survive a demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action and such proof will withstand a motion for nonsuit.
However, the important question is what must be pleaded to justify
substantial recovery. This requires a brief examination of the measure
of substantial damages in contract cases.
"The general rule is that a party who is injured by breach of contract
is entitled to compensation for the injury sustained and is entitled to be
placed, as near as this can be done in money, in the same position he
would have occupied if the contract had been performed. Stated gen-
erally, the measure of damages for the breach of a contract is the
amount which would have been received if the contract had been per-
formed as made, which means the value of the contract, including the
profits and advantages which are its direct results and fruits."'180 Or,
as stated in the leading English case of Hadley v. Baxendale,13 1 which
has been consistently followed in North Carolina :132 "Where two parties
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which
the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract
should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach
of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been
in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the con-
tract, as the probable result of the breach of it."
To the extent that the damages sought normally flow from the kind
of breach of the kind of contract alleged, they are presumed to be
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the making of
the contract. 33  These should be classified as general damages and
proof of them should require no more basis in the pleading than a
general statement to the effect that, by reason of the defendant's breach,
plaintiff has been damaged in a specified amount. Any requirement ot
greater particularity in the pleading would seem to abandon the dis-
tinction between general and special damages. Nevertheless, there is
in our cases some indication that greater particularity is desirable if
not necessary.134  Consequently, if any question can be raised as to
(1949); Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N. C. 740, 12 S. E. 2d 671 (1940); Bowen v.
Fidelity Bank, 209 N. C. 140, 183 S. E. 266 (1935).
... Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 169, 74 S. E. 2d 634, (1953).
19 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 151 (1854).
.3 Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953) ; Price v. Good-
man, 226 N. C. 223, 37 S. E. 2d 592 (1946) ; Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N. C. 406,
35 S. E. 2d 277 (1945) ; Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N. C. 740, 12 S. E. 2d 671 (1940) ;
Builders Supply & Equipment Corp. v. Gadd, 183 N. C. 447, 111 S. E. 771(1922). See also Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N. C. 274, 142 S. E. 12 (1928) ; White
v. Pleasants, 225 N. C. 760, 36 S. E. 2d 227 (1945) (measure of damages in real
estate brokerage cases).
"' Chesson v. Keickheffer Container Co., 216 N. C. 337, 4 S. E. 2d 886 (1939).
... See Bowen v. Fidelity Bank, 209 N. C. 140, 183 S. E. 266 (1935), where the
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whether the allegations of contract and breach clearly imply substantial
damage to the plaintiff, thewise pleader will include specific damage
allegations.
Regardless of how direct and demonstrable the chain of causation
between defendant's breach and plaintiff's damage may be, it is special
damage if it is regarded as arising from the circumstances of the par-
ticular case rather than as a normal and usual consequence of the kind
of breach of the kind of contract alleged. Such special damage is not
recoverable at all unless it was within the contemplation of the parties
at the time the contract was made.135 Consequently, a complaint should
not only expressly allege the special damage, but it should also allege.
that the circumstances giving rise to such damage were known or reason-
ably should have been known to the defendant when he entered into the
contract.' 38 Where the plaintiff claims that defendant's breach pre-
vented him from carrying on a profitable business, or prevented the
court used language which could be construed as meaning that to recover more
than nominal damages in a contract case the complaint must specifically allege
the substantial damages suffered. See also Yonge v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 199 N. C. 16, 153 S. E. 630 (1930). Plaintiff alleged "that she is unable
at this time to specify her damages and losses in detail, but will produce proof
thereof at the trial of this cause; that she estimates her damages . . . at $5,000
and hereby alleges and avers that she has been damaged to that extent, by
reason of the matters and things set forth herein." The court called this allega-
tion "incorrect" and stated that plaintiff could apply to amend. It also men-
tioned a motion to make more definite and certain. It is not clear whether
general or special damages were involved. The true import of this opinion is
made even more problematical by the fact that three of the five judges concurred
only in result. It would seem that the allegation, while unusual and not to be
recommended, is sufficient to support proof of general damages.
"' "Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually
made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to
both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which
they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances
known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could
only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which
would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any
special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special
circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the
breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this
advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them." Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 151 (1854), as quoted in Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C.
159, 170, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953). See also Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N. C.
406. 35 S. E. 2d 277 (1945) ; Lewark v. Norfolk and S. R. R., 137 N. C. 383, 49
S. E. 882 (1905) (defendant, failing to ship ice, not liable for damage to plain-
tiff's fish); Neal v. Pender-Hyman Hardware Co., 122 N. C. 104, 29 S. E. 96(1898) (defendant liable because it was common knowledge in vicinity that failure
to ship tobacco flues would result in damage to plaintiff's tobacco) ; Mace v.
Ramsey, 74 N. C. 11 (1876) (where defendant knew plaintiff was hiring his
boat to transport excursion passengers, he was liable for damages in the light
of such special circumstances).
"' Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953) ; Price v. Good-
man, 226 N. C. 223, 37 S. E. 2d 592 (1946) ; Huyett & Smith Mfg. Co. v. Gray,
111 N. C. 87, 15 S. E. 939 (1892). Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C.- 269, 63 S. E. 1037
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profitable consummation of specific transactions with third parties, it
falls within this special damage category. Such profits may be re-
covered if the pleading and proof satisfy the stated requirements, pro-
vided they may be ascertained with reasonable certainty or, in other
words, are not too remote or speculative.13 7
In some cases there may be recovery for mental anguish, 188 and it
should probably be expressly alleged. Punitive damages may not be
awarded in contract cases except in actions for breach of promise to
marry 189
When a plaintiff successfully sues to rescind a contract, he may not
additionally recover the damages he would have recovered had he sued
for breach. However, if the plaintiff cannot be placed in statu quo by
the rescission, he may recover such damages as are consistent with the
theory of rescission. These damages have been referred to by our
court as "special damages" and it is wise, if not necessary to plead
them expressly.' 40
Many contracts contain a clause providing that a stipulated sum
will be awarded as damages in the event of a breach. These sums have
been called "liquidated," "stipulated," or "stated" damages,' 41 but
regardless of the terminology used, whether they are considered as pro-
viding an enforceable measure of damages or an unenforceable penalty
will depend upon the circumstances of each case,142 If no damages
have in fact been suffered, then no liquidated damages may be re-
covered.143 If substantial damages have been suffered, then the liqui-
dated damage clause should be pleaded and the other allegations should
clearly indicate the actual existence of the substantial damage. Plead-
(1909) may be interpreted as meaning that, in a case involving failure of de-
fendant lessor to put plaintiff lessee into possession, the damage claimed beyond
the difference between rental value and the lease figure is special damage to be
pleaded and proved.
" 'Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953) ; Builders Supply
& Equipment Corp. v. Gadd, 183 N. C. 447, 111 S. E. 771 (1922); Nance v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 177 N. C. 313, 98 S. E. 838 (1919).
...Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949) (breach of
undeitaker's contract to bury plaintiff's dead husband).
Richardson v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S. E. 235(1900).
0°Kee v. Dillingham, 229 N. C. 262, 49 S. E. 2d 510 (1948) (in action to
rescind contract for purchase of land, plaintiff may recover the purchase money
paid, the value of improvements made in good faith-that is, before discovery of
the fraud-taxes paid, and interest, less rental value).
"" Thoroughgood v. Walker, 47 N. C. 15 (1854).
..2 Horn v. Poindexter, 176 N. C. 620, 97 S. E. 653 (1918); Wheedon v.
American Bonding & Trust Co., 128 N. C. 69, 38 S. E. 255 (1901) ; Thoroughgood
v. Walker, 47 N. C. 15 (1854). Where defendant agrees not to enter a certain
business or profession within a stated time, a stipulated damage clause will
probably be construed as liquidated damages rather than a penalty. Brad-
shaw v. Millikin, 173 N. C. 432. 92 S. E. 161 (1917).
'4" Crawford v. Allen, 189 N. C. 434, 127 S. E. 521 (1925).
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ing the facts which show such damage has a double advantage: (1) It
aids in avoiding construction of the clause as an unenforceable penalty;
and (2) it provides a basis for substantial recovery even if the liqui-
dated damage clause is not enforced. 144
If the stipulated damages are allowed, interest may also be recovered
on them from the time of the breach, but only if the contract so pro-
vides. 145 It would seem to follow that this term of the contract should
be alleged either verbatim or by its legal effect.
AcTioNs FOR DEFAMATION
In defamation, an anomalous situation, affecting both the pleading
and the right to recover, has arisen by virtue of the fact that two uses
of the phrase "per se," originally much different in meaning, have come
to be confused and in part welded. Historically, oral defamation was
slander "per se" or "per quod" dependent upon the character of the
charge. "... . If the words falsely spoken charge him with an infamous
offense, or with having an infectious disease, or impeach his trade or
profession, these words are per se actionable, because these words do
necessarily tend to his degradation and injury, and he may recover as a
matter of course without showing that he has actually sustained a dam-
age. But when the words spoken are such as do not on their face
import such degradation as will of course be injurious, as to call a man
a rascal or heretic, then the plaintiff must aver some special damage,
which is called laying his action with a per quod."'14
To these three categories of slander per se developed by judicial
decision a fourth has been added by statute-slander which amounts
to a charge of incontinency against a woman. 147 If the alleged slander
does not fall within one of these four categories, it is not actionable at
all unless special damage is alleged and proved. 148 For this purpose,
1" See Disoway v. Edwards, 134 N. C. 254, 46 S. E. 501 (1904).145Devereux v. Burgwin, 33 N. C. 490 (1850).
14 Pegram v. Stoltz, 76 N. C. 349, 351 (1877) ; accord, Penner v. Elliott, 225
N. C. 33, 33 S. E. 2d 124 (1945); Ringgold v. Land, 212 N. C. 369, 193 S. E.
267 (1937) ; Jones v. Brinkley, 174 N. C. 23, 93 S. E. 372 (1917). To the extent
that the opinion in Broadway v. Cope, 208 N. C. 85, 179 S. E. 452 (1935) may
imply that it is slander per se to charge plaintiff with something which merely
subjects him to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule, it is obviously in error,
having confused slander with libel.
147 N. C. Gmx. STAT. § 99-4 (1943, recompiled 1950) ; Parker v. Edwards, 222
N. C. 75. 21 S. E. 2d 876 (1942) ; Bryant v. Reedy, 214 N. C. 748, 200 S. E.
896 (1938); Bowden v. Bailes, 101 N. C. 612, 8 S. E. 342 (1888); Lucas v.
Nichols, 52 N. C. 32 (1859) ; McBrayer v. Hill, 26 N. C. 136 (1843).
148 The following are examples of charges held not to be slander per se: Penner
v. Elliot, 225 N. C. 33, 33 S. E. 2d 124 (1945) (won't pay honest debts, etc.) ;
Ringgold v. Land, 212 N. C. 369, 193 S. E. 267 (1937) (dishonest man and
damned son of a bitch) ; Deese v. Collins, 191 N. C. 749, 133 S. E. 92 (1926)(negro blood in veins) : Payne v. Thomas, 176 N. C. 401, 97 S. E. 212 (1918)
(father of bastard child).
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"special damage" means pecuniary loss. 149 This, of course, is a mean-
ing entirely different from that given to the same phrase when the law
of defamation is not involved.
Historically, there was no such distinction made in the area of
written defamation. Nevertheless, the phrase, "libel per se," came to be
used to describe those libels defamatory on their face, as distinguished
from those defamatory only by virtue of extrinsic evidence2 °0  The
pleading consequence of holding that written matter is not defamatory
per se would thus seem to be only that the circumstances rendering the
words defamatory on the particular occasion should be alleged and
proved.'51 However, use of the "per se" has led to importation from
the law of slander of the "special damage" concept; and it has been
held that when a libel is not defamatory on its face, special damage
must be alleged and proved.,5 2  But probably the two concepts have
not been completely welded, because, so long as extrinsic evidence is
not needed to show that the words used are defamatory, it is libel per
se, though the same words, if spoken, would not be slander per se be-
"" Scott v. Harrison, 215 N. C. 427, 2 S. E. 2d 1 (1939) ; Payne v. Thomas,
176 N. C. 401, 97 S. E. 212 (1918) ; Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E.
811 (1904). The cases of Ringgold v. Land, 212 N. C. 369, 193 S. E. 267 (1937)
and Penner v. Elliott, 225 N. C. 33, 33 S. E. 2d 124 (1945) quote a more general
definition of special damages, but the Ringgold case also quotes Osborn v. Leach,
supra, with approval. In Jones v. Brinkley, 174 N. C. 23, 93 S. E. 372 (1917)
it is stated that humiliation is special damage; but this is inconsistent with the
language and results of the other cases cited. In Crawford v. Barnes, 118 N. C.
912, 24 S. E. 670 (1896) a question was raised, but not decided, as to whether
loss of an election to Congress would be special damage.
' In Simmons v. Morse, 51 N. C. 6 (1858), the court considered the ques-
tion of whether a letter was libel per se. It is obvious from the opinion that the
discussion had no reference to the necessity of pleading and proving special
damages, but referred only to the question of whether the writing, standing alone,
charged a libel.
. See Wright v. Commercial Credit Co., 212 N. C. 87, 192 S. E. 844 (1937)
(judgment for plaintiff reversed for failure to allege and prove defamatory mean-
ing understood) ; Hurley v. Lovett, 199 N. C. 793, 155 S. E. 875 (1930) ; Sowers
v. Sowers, 87 N. C. 303 (1882); McCurry v. McCurry, 82 N. C. 296 (1880);
Briggs v. Byrd, 33 N. C. 353 (1850); McBrayer v. Hill, 26 N. C. 136 (1843);
Watts v. Greenlee, 13 N. C. 115 (1829). Compare Vincent v. Pace, 178 N. C.
421, 100 S. E. 581 (1919) with Wright v. Commercial Credit Co., eupra.
..2 Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1937). The
court said: "In publications which are libelous per quod the innuendo and special
damages must be alleged and proved." The only North Carolina authority re-
lied upon for this was Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14.
169 S. E. 869 (1933), a slander case concerned with the question of whether the
words amounted to such a charge of crime as to be slander per se. It is clear
from the opinion in the Oates case that extrinsic evidence is admissible on the
meaning of the charge, and that, in the light of such evidence, the words may be
held to be slander per se, which would eliminate the necessity for special damages.
It is thus apparent that the Flake case misinterpreted the Oates case.
The Flake case divides libels into three types: (1) Those obviously defama-
tory (per se) ; (2) those susceptible of two interpretations, one defamatory and
the other not; and (3) those not defamatory except with the aid of other cir-
cumstances (per quod). The opinion holds that special damages need not be
alleged with (1) and must be alleged with (3). The status of (2) is left some-
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cause not falling within one of the four categories outlined above.1 5 3
It remains to be seen whether the law of slander will now borrow from
the law of libel and require allegation and proof of special damages
when the words spoken are not actionable, standing alone, even though,
when interpreted in the light of extrinsic evidence, they amount to a
charge falling within one of the four categories of slander per se.154
It seems very doubtful that whether extrinsic evidence must be re-
sorted to is a justifiable criterion for determining whether special
damages must be shown; but it must be assumed to be the North Caro-
lina criterion, at least as to libel, until there is further judicial con-
sideration of the matter.
The general rule is frequently stated that, when the charge is de-
famatory per se, malice is presumed, while otherwise malice must be
alleged and proved.1 55 Which meaning is to be attributed to "per se"
in this connection is none too clear, but as the rule has been enunciated
what uncertain, but the opinion seems to indicate that special damages need not
be alleged if the complaint alleges that the defamatory meaning was intended
and understood. Under the Oates case, if a defamation falls under (2) the jury
decides the meaning intended and understood. To the same effect is Castelloe v.
Phelps, 198 N. C. 454, 152 S. E. 163 (1930).
153 The statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 99-4 (1943, recompiled 1950), dealing with
charges of incontinency against a woman, applies to both libel and slander. Flake
v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 786, 195 S. E. 55, 60 (1937) defines as a
libel per se everything defined as slander per se in Pegram v. Stolz, 76 N. C.
349, 351 (1877) (see text at note 146), and adds to that definition a charge which
"tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace' Thus, so far as charges
which are unambiguous on their face are concerned, practically the whole range
of defamatory matter falls within the definition of libel per se, and special damages
need not be alleged.
This broad definition of libel per se is supported by a long line of earlier cases.
though, as already explained, the "per se," as used in their opinions did not carry
any implication with respect to special damages. See, for example, Davis v.
Askin's Retail Stores, 211 N. C. 551, 191 S. E. 33 (1937) (rule as stated in text
clearly recognized); Harrell v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936)(without mentioning special damages, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to
recover for libel on a charge clearly not within any of the four categories of
slander per se) ; Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E.
869 (1933) ; Pentuff v. Park, 194 N. C. 146, 138 S. E. 616 (1927) (distinguishing
libel and slander) ; Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517 (1922) ;
Hall v. Hall, 179 N. C. 571. 103 S. E. 136 (1920); Brown v. Elm City Lum-
ber Co., 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914).
15 Cases antedating Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E.
55 (1937) did not require allegation and proof of special damages in such situa-
tions. See, for example. Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.. 205 N. C. 14,
169 S. E. 869 (1933) ; Hurlev v. Lovett. 199 N. C. 793, 155 S. E. 875 (1930) ;
Simmons v. Morse, 51 N. C. 6 (1858). Scott v. Harrison, 215 N. C. 427, 2 S. E.
1 (1939), decided after the Flake case, seems to imply that it would not be
necessary.
1.. Penner v. Elliott, 225 N. C. 33. 33 S. E. 2d 124 (1945) (slander) ; Ringgold
v. Land, 212 N. C. 369, 193 S. E. 267 (1937) (slander) ; Oates v. Wachovia Bank
and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933) (slander) ; Beck v. Bank of
Thomasville. 161 N. C. 201, 76 S. E. 722 (1912) (slander); Ramsev v. Cheek,
109 N. C. 270. 13 S. E. 775 (1891) (libel) ; Bowden v. Bailes, 101 N. C. 612. 8
S. E. 342 (1888) (slander).
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in both slander and libel cases, it seems that either meaning might be
read into it. As a pleading matter this may not be too important, as it
is customary to allege malice in all defamation complaints, but the
possible difference in meaning may be critical in connection with the
proof required.
In either libel or slander general damages for injury to reputation,
for physical pain and inconvenience, and for humiliation, embarrass-
ment and mental suffering may be recovered (in addition to special
damage when the latter is a necessary element of the cause of action;
otherwise alone).'5 6  Strictly speaking, it is probably unnecessary
that they be alleged ;'z5 but it is customary and the safer policy to do so.
It seems probable that pecuniary loss, having been labeled "special dam-
ages" for purposes of the distinction between defamation per se and
defamation per quod, should be expressly alleged even in a per se case.
Once an item has been labeled "special damage" for any purpose, it is
likely to follow that it will also be so labeled for purposes of determining
whether express pleading is necessary to lay the basis for proof.
Punitive damages may be recovered where the defendant's conduct
is malicious, wanton or reckless ;158 and, when their recovery is sought,
the complaint should contain allegations showing such conduct together
with an express demand for punitive damages.
There is a statutory regulation as to giving notice before action is
brought on a defamation published in a newspaper or periodical or
through a radio or television station. This gives an opportunity to re-
tract. The giving of the notice should be alleged; but even if there is a
retraction, all damages otherwise recoverable, except punitive damages,
may still be recovered. 59
I" Payne v. Thomas, 176 N. C. 401, 97 S. E. 212 (1918); Osborn v. Leach,
135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811 (1904).
.. No proof is required to justify their recovery; and lack of such proof does
not confine the recovery to nominal damages. Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217
N. C. 13, 6 S. E. 2d 882 (1939) ; Flake y. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780,
195 S. E. 55 (1937) ; Barringer v. Deal, 164 N. C. 246, 80 S. E. 161 (1913). Of
course, as a practical matter, proof is -advisable in an attempt to increase the
verdict.
... Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N. C. 13, 6 S. E. 2d 882 (1939) ; Lay
v. Gazette Publishing Co., 209 N. C. 134, 183 S. E, 416 (1935) ; Broadway v.
Cope, 208 N. C. 85, 179 S. E. 452 (1935); Baker v. Winslow, 184 N. C. 1, 113
S. E. 570 (1922) ("an element of fraud, malice, gross negligence, insult, or other
cause of aggravation"); Cotton v. Fisheries Products Co., 181 N. C. 151, 106
S. E. 487 (1921) ("actually malicious or wanton, displaying a spirit of mischief
toward the plaintiff, or of reckless and criminal indifference to his rights");
Fields v. Bynum, 156 N. C. 413, 72 S. E. 449 (1911) ; Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C.
628, 47 S. E. 811 (1904). The same allegations may lay the basis for arrest of
the defendant. See Crowder v. Stiers, 215 N. C. 123, 1 S. E. 2d 353 (1939)
Swain v. Oakley, 190 N. C. 113, 129 S. E. 151 (1925).
.. N. C. GEx. STAT. §§ 99-1 through 99-3 (1943, recompiled 1950); Roth v.
Greensboro News Co., 217 N. C. 13, 6 S. E. 2d 882 (1939) ; Lay v. Gazette Pub-
lishing Co., 209 N. C. 134, 183 S. E. 416 (1935) ; Paul v. National Auction Co.,
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By statute, the defendant in defamation may, in his answer, allege
both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages; and whether he proves
the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating cir-
cumstances.1 60 This requires affirmative pleading in the answer, as
denials, standing alone, will not permit the defendant to introduce evi-
dence showing justification or mitigation.1 61
181 N. C. 1, 105 S. E. 881 (1921) (raises, without deciding, question of whether
statute applies to actions against persons not connected with the newspaper,
perodical, or station); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628, 47 S. E. 811 (1904);
Williams v. Smith, 134 N. C. 249, 46 S. E. 502 (1904).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-158 (1943).
... Bryant v. Reedy, 214 N. C. 748, 200 S. E. 896 (1938); Burris v. Bush,
170 N. C. 394, 87 'S. E. 97 (1915) ; Dickerson v. Dail, 159 N. C. 541, 75 S. E. 803(1912) ; Upchurch v. Robertson, 127 N. C. 127, 37 S. E. 157 (1900).
